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Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian 
Criminal Law:  
The Marijuana Trilogy and the 
Forcible “Correction” of Children 
Janine Benedet* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When taken together, it is possible to reduce an analysis of the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Malmo-Levine,1 upholding the 
prohibition on possession of marijuana, and its decision in Canadian 
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral),2 upholding the defence of “reasonable correction” for parents and 
teachers charged with assaulting a child, as signaling a posture of defer-
ence to Parliament in matters of criminal law. It is also possible to ex-
plain the decisions as indicating that while abuse of oneself can be 
considered criminal, at least some abuse of one’s children may not. 
Viewed more charitably, and probably with more accuracy, the two 
decisions can be seen as saying something very important about the 
limits of the criminal law and the role that section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms plays in setting those limits.3 To that 
                                                                                                                                
* LL.B. (U.B.C.), LL.M., S.J.D. (Mich.); Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, Toronto, Ontario. 
1
 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 179 
C.C.C. (3d) 517 released concurrently with R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, [2003] S.C.J. No. 
80, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 540 [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine” or “the marijuana possession case”]. 
2
 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6 [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation” or “the 
section 43 challenge”]. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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end, it is significant that the majority on the section 7 analysis is com-
posed of substantially the same members of the Court in both cases.4  
In addition, the decision in Canadian Foundation, while reinforcing 
the ongoing debate at the Supreme Court on the proper understanding of 
section 15(1) of the Charter, deals a blow to historically subordinated 
groups seeking to use the right to equality to expose their experiences of 
state-sanctioned and socially accepted violence. In particular, the appar-
ent revival by the Court of the long-discredited public/private distinction 
as relevant to the legal understanding of crimes of violence deserves 
scrutiny. 
The attempt by some members of the Court to establish a “de mini-
mis” principle in criminal law also links these two decisions. As a mat-
ter of the division of powers, the federal criminal law power in section 
91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 5 is very broad and not constrained 
by a meaningful “harm” requirement. The decisions in Canadian Foun-
dation and Malmo-Levine make clear that the substantive content of the 
“principles of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter do not 
permit the courts to evaluate rigorously under the ambit of the “harm” 
principle Parliament’s decisions to invoke the criminal law power be-
yond a de minimis threshold. Yet even the invocation of a de minimis 
standard may represent a substantial shift in thinking in light of the 
historic reluctance of criminal courts to recognize de minimis as a com-
mon law defence. Thus it is worth considering whether the real impact 
of these decisions, and in particular of Malmo-Levine, will be to revive 
such a defence. 
Taken together, these decisions are especially troubling to this au-
thor because I think that the Court got it right in Malmo-Levine, and 
wrong in Canadian Foundation. Yet not a single member of the Court 
                                                                                                                                
4
 In Malmo-Levine, majority reasons were written together by Gonthier and Binnie JJ., 
concurred in by McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ. Arbour, Deschamps 
and LeBel JJ. dissented. In Canadian Foundation, McLachlin C.J. wrote the majority reasons, 
with Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. concurring. Justice Binnie dis-
sented in part on the s. 15 ground, but agreed with the majority on its interpretation and 
application of s. 7. In both cases, Arbour and Deschamps JJ. dissented. Thus the only judge to 
take a different view of the application of s. 7 in the two cases was LeBel J. 
5 Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
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shared these views in their entirety.6 This paper, therefore, argues for a 
result not supported by any member of the Court: uphold the prohibition 
on marijuana possession and strike down the “reasonable correction” 
defence. 
II. SECTION 7 AND THE “HARM” PRINCIPLE 
The section 7 analysis in Malmo-Levine is premised on the defen-
dant’s assertion that the principles of fundamental justice include a 
“harm principle”. This principle would prevent recourse to the criminal 
law where the conduct in question was not harmful at all, or alterna-
tively where it could not be shown to pose a significant risk of harm to 
others. The Court struggles with this proposition, in part because it must 
deal with three different harm principles: “harm” as a component of the 
criminal law power in section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867; 
“harm” as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the 
Charter; and “harm” as trigger for a common law defence of de minimis 
non curat lex. The question is whether the “harm principle” under sec-
tion 7 is something different than these two other understandings of 
harm in the criminal law, or whether they should be interpreted as three 
coterminous manifestations of the same principle. While the court does 
not quite characterize the issue before it in this way, the interrelationship 
between these three types of harm is important to understanding the 
majority’s conclusion in Malmo-Levine. 
The first context in which the concept of “harm” is relevant is in the 
application of the federal criminal law power in section 91(27) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. In the companion appeal of R. v. Caine,7 the 
appellant argued that the criminalization of marijuana possession fell 
outside the federal jurisdiction over criminal law. The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected this argument. The Court accepted that one major 
purpose of the prohibition on marijuana possession had always been to 
protect health and public safety. This brought it within the permissible 
scope of the criminal law, which required “some evil or injurious or 
                                                                                                                                
6 Justice Binnie comes closest in the result. Justice Binnie upheld the prohibition on 
marijuana possession, but would have found that the s. 43 defence violated the equality rights 
of children as it applied to teachers.  
7  [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79. 
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undesirable effect upon the public against whom the law is directed”.8 
According to the Court, so long as some legitimate public purpose un-
derlies the prohibition, and it does not colourably invade an area of 
provincial competence, the law is intra vires Parliament. Control of a 
psychoactive drug that causes alteration of mental function raised clear 
issues of public health and safety, bringing it within the ambit of section 
91(27). The Court specifically noted that the protection of vulnerable 
groups from self-inflicted harm, characterized by the appellant as im-
permissible “legal moralism”, was a legitimate concern of the criminal 
law. 
The division of powers argument did not, in any event, really ad-
dress the substance of the defendants’ complaint about marijuana prohi-
bition, which was directed at the fact of prohibition itself, rather than at 
the idea that it should fall within provincial competence. Using the divi-
sion of powers to strike down laws that trench on civil liberties may 
have been a necessity in the pre-Charter era, but it makes little sense 
now in this context, unless the argument is able to distinguish what is 
distinct about the criminal prohibition that limits its use in cases where a 
provincial offence would be acceptable.9  
The difference cannot be the use of imprisonment, since provincial 
offences can carry terms of imprisonment as well, and section 7 turns in 
any event on the significance of the deprivation of liberty. Nor is it the 
mere fact of the availability of prosecution by indictment, which tends 
to give the accused more procedural rights (like a jury trial). The rele-
vant point might be the imposition of a criminal record, particularly 
since the effect such a record has on the ability to find work or travel 
abroad can be significant. Most human rights statutes that protect 
against discrimination on the basis of one’s “record of offences” limit 
that protection to provincial records, indicating that the criminal record 
is seen as legitimately carrying significant stigma, at least where no 
pardon has been granted.10 While the negative effects of a criminal re-
cord were clearly raised in argument before the Court, their connection 
to the division of powers argument appears to have been unexplored. 
                                                                                                                                
8 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 73, quoting the “Margarine Reference” (Refer-
ence re Validity of section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, at 49). 
9 For a summary of this history see, P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (To-
ronto: Carswell, 2003 1st. ed.), at pp. 684-85. 
10 See, e.g., Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10(1) (“record of offences”). 
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The question that arises with respect to section 7 of the Charter is 
whether the principles of fundamental justice include a notion of harm 
that is more definite than the elastic boundaries of the federal criminal 
law power. The answer to this question must focus on the fact that the 
section 7 liberty interest is engaged in situations in which the law is not 
merely penal in character, but also carries with it the potential for im-
prisonment. Should the availability of imprisonment change the degree 
of harm required from the “legitimate public purpose” of the division of 
powers analysis to a requirement of significant or substantial harm? Or, 
in the alternative, should it require proof that the risk of harm is to per-
sons other than the accused? 
The notion that the principles of fundamental justice demand an ex-
amination of the relationship between the state interest and the use of 
the penalty of imprisonment to further that interest is not without juris-
prudential support. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen-
eral), the majority held that a breach of section 7 is made out where “the 
deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance the 
state’s interest” since “the individual’s rights will have been deprived 
for no valid purpose”.11 Yet even these comments, focusing on whether 
the use of criminal law advances the state interest, assume that such an 
interest does exist. In Malmo-Levine, the defendants primarily argued 
that there was no valid state interest at all. In the alternative, they as-
serted that criminalization does more harm than good in achieving any 
such interest. 
The majority of the Court in Malmo-Levine, relying on its decision 
in Rodriguez, finds that a principle of fundamental justice must be: 
a legal principle about which there is significant societal consensus that it 
is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to 
operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of 
...liberty....12  
The majority rejects the argument that a harm principle, defined in 
these terms, is a principle of fundamental justice. The majority doubts 
that the “harm principle” is properly characterized as legal principle, but 
                                                                                                                                
11 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 594, [1993] S.C.J. No. 94. 
12 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 113. 
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even assuming such a characterization, they find that it is not a require-
ment for criminal prohibition. There are Code offences that do not cause 
harm to living persons (like cruelty to animals or interference with a 
dead body) and those which cause no harm to anyone other than the 
individuals who consent to them (like dueling or “consensual” incest).13 
Canadian criminal law has rejected the idea that punishing harm to self 
is impermissible paternalism, noted the majority, since the costs of self-
harm are often borne collectively. What is more, Canadian society is 
willing to recognize the validity of punishing “moral harm” in the sense 
of conduct that threatens fundamental or essential social values. This led 
the majority to conclude that, “Parliament ... is entitled to act under the 
criminal law power in the protection of legitimate state interests other 
than the avoidance of harm to others, subject to Charter limits such as 
the rules against arbitrariness, irrationality and gross disproportional-
ity”.14 
What sort of limits, if any, are placed by this last condition? “Arbi-
trariness and irrationality” sound a lot like the kinds of very elastic 
thresholds constraining the use of the criminal law power in section 
91(27). As for “gross disproportionality”, it refers, of course, to the test 
for “cruel and unusual punishment” under section 12, imported into 
section 7. On this point, the majority finds that it is the use of imprison-
ment that is relevant, rather than the availability of imprisonment. Since 
imprisonment is rarely imposed for simple possession absent aggravat-
ing factors, neither section 7 nor section 12 is violated. This approach in 
general makes sense, as many criminal offences provide a range of 
sentences whose upper end would be grossly disproportionate if im-
posed for conduct at the lower end. Manslaughter, where the available 
sentences range from probation to life imprisonment, is a good exam-
ple.15 The remedy for such excesses, explains the Court, is an ordinary 
sentence appeal. Thus one can distinguish the prohibition on marijuana 
                                                                                                                                
13 Of course, there are reasonable claims of “harm” that can attach to all of these ac-
tions. Cruelty to animals does cause unnecessary pain to a living creature. Interference with a 
dead body presents public health concerns, in addition to causing distress to the bereaved. 
“Consensual” incest is often anything but mutually beneficial and desired. Citing these 
examples, then, is not meant to endorse the Court’s invocation of them; one does not have to 
embrace the value of legal paternalism to find a reason for upholding bestiality laws. 
14 Supra, note 1, at para. 129. 
15 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 236(b). 
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possession from the prohibition on importing narcotics struck down in 
R. v. Smith, where the seven-year sentence of imprisonment was manda-
tory regardless of the quantity imported, and from the Motor Vehicle 
Reference, where the Court did say that the potential for imprisonment 
was enough to violate section 7 where there was no mens rea required 
for conviction.16 
Yet the “gross disproportionality” standard may still operate in an 
offence with a wide range of possible sentences in a fashion akin to the 
principle of de minimis non curat lex. The de minimis principle, typi-
cally translated as the maxim that “the law does not concern itself with 
trifling things”, has not found general acceptance in Canadian criminal 
law despite its longevity.17 If recognized in the criminal law, the de 
minimis principle would operate as a common law defence in the nature 
of an excuse that would allow the accused the opportunity to establish 
that, even though the actus reus and mens rea of the offence are made 
out, the breach is so trivial that no criminal culpability should be at-
tached.18 This principle might apply to the man charged with theft for 
sampling a cashew from the “bulk bin” at the supermarket, or the stu-
dent charged with assault for spraying a classmate with a water pistol. 
Such “cases” are typically dealt with through the exercise of social 
convention. We rely heavily on social understandings about what sort of 
behaviour is too trivial to merit state involvement to dissuade individu-
als from complaining to the police about such matters. When that con-
sensus is disrupted, we rely on police and prosecutorial discretion to 
screen out trivial cases from prosecution. Yet this is not a uniform or 
reliable result. Most criminal defence lawyers have represented clients 
charged with theft for stealing items of nominal value, pursuant to a 
                                                                                                                                
16 R. v. Smith (Edward Dewey), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 36; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 23 
C.C.C. (3d) 289, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73. 
17 R. v. Chau, [1996] A.J. No. 1019 (Prov. Ct.) (sargeant touched junior officer on scarf 
and buttocks, de minimis applied to acquit of sexual assault); R. v. Chessa, [1983] B.C.J. No. 
1201 (C.A.) (intoxicated accused called taxi from bar, moved his car to another parking space 
before taking taxi home; court undecided if de minimis exists but driving not trivial, accused 
convicted of impaired driving); R. v. Joe, [1992] Y.J. No. 140 (Terr. Ct.) (de minimis applied 
to acquit accused of assault for shaking co-worker); R. v. Appleby, (1990) 78 C.R. (3d) 282, 
[1990] O.J. No. 1329 (Prov. Ct.) (de minimis applied to acquit accused of possession of stolen 
property where copy of budget document valued at $0.02). 
18 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 8(3). 
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retailer’s “zero tolerance” anti-shoplifting policies.19 Moreover, courts 
have shown considerable reluctance to apply the de minimis principle to 
Criminal Code offences, notwithstanding a willingness to recognize it in 
other settings.20 
Yet the majority in Malmo-Levine appears to accept the relevance of 
the de minimis principle for section 7, noting that “[o]nce it is demon-
strated, as it has been here, that the harm is not de minimis, or in the 
words of Braidwood J.A., the harm is ‘not [in]significant or trivial,’ the 
precise weighing and calculation of the nature and extent of the harm is 
Parliament’s job”.21 This seems to indicate an acceptance by the Su-
preme Court of the de minimis defence, at least where there is a liberty 
interest at stake. Malmo-Levine may therefore represent an implicit 
recognition that the de minimis principle is a principle of fundamental 
justice and thus a valid common law defence. 
Justice Arbour, in her dissenting reasons in Canadian Foundation, 
would also be prepared to recognize the de minimis principle in the 
criminal law setting. She argues that the defence could be raised for 
trivial assaults which, in the parent-child context, might include a “pat 
on the bum” or the placing of an unwilling child in a car seat. In fact, 
some trial judges in assault cases have considered the defence; most 
have declined to conclusively decide its availability, and have proceeded 
to find the assault not a trivial one in any event.22 Justice Arbour notes 
that the principle could also apply where defendants are in possession of 
very small amounts of marijuana. At least one lower court has reached 
such a result, in a situation where the accused was in possession of a 
pipe that tested positive for marijuana residue.23 
                                                                                                                                
19 See, e.g., R. v. Li, [1984] O.J. No. 569 (H.C.), where the judge allowed the Crown’s 
appeal from an acquittal for theft where the value of the stolen screwdriver bit was less than 
$1.00. The High Court judge found that the trial judge erred in recognizing a de minimis 
principle in theft cases. 
20 See, e.g., Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 62, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
1031, at para. 65 (breach of contract). 
21 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 133. 
22 See, e.g., R. v. Daniels, [2001] S.J. No. 503 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Phillips, [1992] N.B.J. 
No. 135 (Prov. Ct.). 
23 A useful summary of the inconsistent availability of the defence in the context of 
drug possession is found in R. v. Brett (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 353, [1985] B.C.J. No. 3049 
(Co. Ct.); revd (1986), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 190, [1986] B.C.J. No. 751. 
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There is a clear reluctance on the part of trial courts to recognize the 
de minimis defence. This reluctance stems in part from their obligation 
to follow the language of the statute. If Parliament wanted to specify a 
minimum amount of drugs that one might legally possess before the 
criminal sanction is triggered, it is free to do so. In addition, there is a 
very real concern about where the triviality ends. Certainly defendants 
in cases of spousal violence against women have, predictably, attempted 
to invoke the defence.24  
It is also important to note that those cases which have considered 
the application of de minimis to charges of marijuana possession have 
focused on the trivial harm based on the amount of drugs possessed. The 
courts have not considered whether the de minimis defence should apply 
on the basis that the harm of possessing marijuana for personal con-
sumption is itself trivial. The connection between the two claims is 
obvious: how else to explain why the law should not concern itself with 
possession of marijuana residue in a pipe except by reference to the lack 
of harm that residue might cause? Of course, implicit in the recognition 
of the defence is the understanding that there must be some violations of 
the law that are not trivial. The majority of the Supreme Court found 
some specific examples of the harm of marijuana consumption, for 
example, to vulnerable groups such as adolescents. It remains to be seen 
whether a de minimis defence might succeed where it can be shown that 
a particular defendant does not fall into one of the groups the Court sees 
the law as validly protecting.25 
The real issue in these cases is one of institutional competence. 
Given that almost any conduct carries with it some non-trivial risk of 
harm, who is better placed to determine that harm: Parliament or the 
courts? The majority of the Supreme Court was correct to leave this 
                                                                                                                                
24 In R. v. Downey (2002), 208 N.S.R. (2d) 153, [2002] N.S.J. No. 442 (S.C.) and R. v. 
Stewart, [1996] O.J. No. 2704 (Prov. Div.), the courts held that such a defence was never 
applicable in domestic violence cases; while in R. v. Da Costa, [1991] Y.J. No. 64 (Terr. Ct.) 
the trial judge found that a slap in the face was not a trivial assault, but granted the accused 
husband a conditional discharge. In R. v. Periovolaris (1998), 41 W.C.B. (2d) 124 (Ont. Prov. 
Div.) (pulling necklace off wife’s neck) and R. v. Peniston, [2003] N.S.J. No. 29 (Prov. Ct.) 
(pushing wife during argument in public place), acquittals were entered based on the applica-
tion of the de minimis defence. 
25 Such a result would produce the irony that the most vulnerable accused would be the 
least able to avoid conviction, since the effects on them of marijuana consumption are not 
trivial. 
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job to Parliament and not use the substantive component of “funda-
mental justice” to sit as an unelected legislature. Leaving this determi-
nation to the Parliamentary process makes sense, if only because it 
allows Parliament to respond to arguments about degrees of harm and 
about the methods best suited to address them. After all, there are 
many advocates for the decriminalization of “hard” drugs as well, on 
the ground that they are a health issue rather than a criminal one; the 
Charter is not the instrument of choice for advancing such claims.26  
Of course, the adoption of the trivial harm standard is not unprob-
lematic. It seems to suggest that Parliament could criminalize any activ-
ity that met the legitimate interest threshold. Since it is almost always 
possible to identify some harmful consequence of an activity to the actor 
or to others, this gives the criminal law power an almost unlimited 
scope. For example, could Parliament criminalize golf because of the 
environmental damage required to produce the courses, or the risk to 
others from errant flying balls?27 Even if the criminal law power is lim-
ited to those subjects that have traditionally been the subject of the 
criminal law, combined with the more than trivial harm requirement, 
this may not be enough to protect golf from prohibition. After all, the 
Criminal Code does impose penalties in the context of a number of 
other sports, such as waterskiing at night.28 There appears to be no con-
stitutional impediment to the creation of a criminal offence of “golfing 
at night” on the same reasoning. Perhaps these examples suggest that the 
correct debate is not one of the relative significance of harm to others, 
versus harm to community values, versus harm to self, but rather the 
level and certainty of harm of any of these kinds that flows from the 
potentially criminal act. Or perhaps we are content to let golfers, water 
skiers and consumers of marijuana use the democratic process to resist 
                                                                                                                                
26 For a useful discussion of the perceived benefits and probable consequences of le-
galization or decriminalization of cocaine and heroin, see R.J. MacCoun and P. Reuter, Drug 
War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001) 328-41. 
27 After all, the Court has already confirmed in its freedom of association cases that 
golf is not a constitutionally protected activity: Reference re Public Service Employee Rela-
tions Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 408, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10. 
28 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 250(2). 
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overcriminalization as they see it, and leave the courts, and section 7 of 
the Charter, out of such debates.29 
III. SECTION 15 AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE REVIVAL 
While the guarantee of equality in section 15(1) of the Charter was 
raised in both Malmo-Levine and Canadian Foundation, it was given 
serious consideration only in the latter decision. In Malmo-Levine, the 
appellant argued that the offence of possession of marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking discriminated on the basis of “substance orienta-
tion” or “occupational orientation” as analogous grounds under section 
15(1).30 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument that 
these were cognizable grounds of discrimination under section 15: 
The true focus of s. 15 is to “remedy or prevent discrimination against 
groups subject to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and 
social prejudice in Canadian society”: Swain, supra at p. 992, per Lamer 
C.J.; and Rodriguez, supra, at p. 616. To uphold Malmo-Levine’s 
argument for recreational choice (or lifestyle protection) on the basis of s. 
15 of the Charter would simply be to create a parody of a noble purpose.31 
This conclusion is hardly surprising; the Court has been justifiably 
reluctant to recognize new analogous grounds of discrimination solely 
on the basis that individuals have been criminally prosecuted on the 
                                                                                                                                
29  I have not considered in this article the s. 7 claim advanced in Canadian Foundation, 
despite the concern it has caused to others: see Paul Burstein and Roslyn Levine, Q.C. in this 
volume. In particular, they are concerned that Canadian Foundation’s argument that s. 43 of 
the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter was an attempt to use s. 7 as a “sword” that 
would require the government to criminalize certain behaviour that harms others, rather than 
as a “shield” to limit the ability of government to create crimes. I do not think that the s. 7 
challenge in Canadian Foundation should be viewed in this manner. The Foundation was 
challenging something that Parliament had affirmatively done, namely enacting the s. 43 
defence. It was not seeking an order that Parliament do anything; it was asking the Court to 
strike down an existing section of the Code. I have not dealt with that argument at length 
here, since I am of the view that Canadian Foundation is a case about children’s equality 
rights, and since in the s. 15(1) context the distinction between positive and negative rights 
has been undermined, thankfully, by the decision in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 
[1998] S.C.J. No. 29. 
30
  Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. N-1, s. 4(2); repealed and replaced by Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, Schedule II, s. 1. 
31
  Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 185. 
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basis of those characteristics. The mere fact that criminalization is tied 
to a particular behaviour or personal characteristic that a group of indi-
viduals share — a sexual interest in children or the enjoyment of animal 
abuse — does not tell us very much about whether the criminalization is 
discriminatory or implicates an equality interest, as socially defined.  
In order to sustain his argument, the appellant in this case attempted 
to argue that criminalization for “harmless hedonism” demonstrated the 
nexus to the discriminatory action on the part of the state. This charac-
terization, of course, brings us right back to the harm principle consid-
ered under section 7. For the section 15(1) argument to be a distinct 
constitutional claim, the appellant would need to argue that even if it is 
not a principle of fundamental justice that there must be a significant 
risk of harm to others before an activity can be subject to a penalty of 
imprisonment, the use of the criminal law for only some activities that 
fail to meet this standard is discriminatory, a point already rejected by 
the Court under the “arbitrary or irrational” test. Alternatively, the 
claimants might have tried to show some discriminatory pattern in the 
enforcement of the law, a point apparently not developed in argument, 
notwithstanding disproportionate numbers of young adults prosecuted 
under the statute. 
An important section 15(1) argument was made in Canadian Foun-
dation, in which the Foundation argued that the reasonable correction 
defence in section 43 of the Criminal Code discriminated against chil-
dren on the basis of their age, by providing accused persons with a de-
fence to the assault of children in some circumstances that would not 
apply to assault of an adult victim. The majority of the Court, in reasons 
written by McLachlin C.J., found no infringement of section 15(1). The 
Court’s rather cursory conclusion on this point is not encouraging for 
those who despair at the ongoing inability of the Supreme Court to grasp 
the concept of substantive equality.  
The ground of discrimination, age, is an enumerated ground, so there 
can be no dispute that section 15(1) is engaged. There is also no question 
that the Code provision imposes a disadvantage on children not imposed on 
adults, namely the disadvantage of being hit or slapped or restrained by a 
parent or a teacher in circumstances where that adult is shielded from 
criminal prosecution by operation of the defence. The majority rejects the 
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assertion that this fact alone is not enough to make the provision discrimi-
natory because it would “ . . . equat[e] equal treatment with identical treat-
ment, a proposition which our jurisprudence has consistently rejected”.32 
This is quite true as an abstract principle, but it does not automatically ex-
plain why facially disadvantageous treatment can be justified in this case. 
To answer that question, the Court reformulates the applicable standard for 
a section 15(1) violation multiple times, until it eventually produces a test 
that allows it to find that there is no age discrimination in the operation of 
section 43 of the Code. 
The majority begins by invoking the general principles set out in the 
Law33 decision, namely “whether a reasonable person possessing the 
claimant’s attributes and in the claimant’s circumstances would con-
clude that the law marginalizes the claimant or treats her as less worthy 
on the basis of irrelevant characteristics”.34 However, the majority con-
tinues, since this would raise the fiction of the “reasonable, fully-
apprised, preschool-aged child”, the correct relevant perspective is that 
of the “reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, who seriously 
values the child’s views and developmental needs”.35 The majority fails 
to notice that this person sounds a lot like the accused, or at least like the 
accused as characterized by defence counsel, creating an odd vantage 
point from which to judge the interests of victims of what would other-
wise be assaults. The majority then proceeds to combine these stan-
dards, asking whether “... viewed from the perspective of the reasonable 
person identified above, does Parliament’s choice not to criminalize 
reasonable use of corrective force against children offend their human 
dignity and freedom, by marginalizing them or treating them as less 
worthy without regard to their actual circumstances?”36  
This assessment, in turn, is to be determined by regard to the four 
factors first identified in Law: “(1) pre-existing disadvantage; (2) corre-
spondence between the distinction and the claimant’s characteristics or 
circumstances; (3) the existence of ameliorative purposes or effects; and 
                                                                                                                                
32
  Canadian Foundation, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 51. 
33  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
34
  Canadian Foundation, supra, note 32, at para. 53. 
35
  Id. 
36
  Id., at para. 54. 
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(4) the nature of the interest affected”.37 The majority finds that the first, 
third and fourth of these factors are met: children are members of a 
vulnerable group; the defence is not designed to ameliorate the condi-
tion of persons belonging to another more disadvantaged group, and the 
interest affected — bodily integrity — is profound.  
However, the Court finds no discrimination because the second fac-
tor, “correspondence with actual circumstances”, shows that the law is 
not discriminatory. Chief Justice McLachlin argues that children need 
not only protection from physical harm, but also guidance and discipline 
from parents and teachers. This, in turn, requires a “stable and secure 
family and school setting”. She argues that section 43 accommodates 
these needs of children by resorting to the criminal law only when force 
is used not as part of a genuine effort at correction and poses no reason-
able risk of harm that is more than transitory or trifling. To do otherwise 
“risks ruining lives and breaking up families”. This leads her to con-
clude: 
 I am satisfied that a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, 
apprised of the harms of criminalization that section 43 avoids, the 
presence of other governmental initiatives to reduce the use of corporal 
punishment, and the fact that abusive and harmful conduct is still 
prohibited by the criminal law, would not conclude that the child’s dignity 
has been offended in a manner contemplated by section 15(1). Children 
often feel a sense of dispowerment and vulnerability; this reality must be 
considered when assessing the impact of section 43 on a child’s sense of 
dignity.38 
Without section 43, the majority reasons, parents and teachers 
would risk criminal punishment for placing a child in a chair for a five-
minute “time out”.39 The fact that the reasonable person here is supposed 
to take into account the “views of the child” seems to have fallen out of 
the analysis, except insofar as children are assumed not to want their 
families torn apart. Whether children have views on whether being hit 
teaches them anything, and if so, what those lessons are, is not consid-
ered. 
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  Id., at para. 55. 
38
  Id., at para. 68. 
39
   Id., at para. 62. 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) Hierarchies of Harm in Cdn. Crim. Law 231 
 
The section 15(1) analysis employed by the majority in this case 
makes abundantly clear the shortcomings of the Law test for discrimina-
tion, as refined and reinterpreted in subsequent cases. The first and most 
obvious problem with the Law test is the focus on “dignity” as a proxy 
for equality. In Law, the Court found that the purpose of equality rights 
was to recognize the fundamental human dignity of each individual, in 
the sense of their inherent self-worth. This statement is hard to criticize; 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the assertion 
that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.40 
But this does not mean that dignity is the same thing as equality. That 
the two are distinct concepts is made clear in the constitutions of coun-
tries such as Germany and South Africa, which provide specific rights to 
dignity quite apart from their constitutional equality rights.41  
In particular, the dignity principle should not mean that the claimant 
in an equality rights case should have to prove that the discrimination in 
question was not only discriminatory but also demeaning to the claim-
ant’s dignity. As applied by the Court, this requirement has the odd 
effect of penalizing individuals who are able to maintain their dignity in 
the face of oppression. It makes it much more difficult to challenge 
differential allocations of benefits, since the government’s inevitably 
benign purpose can be pointed to as meaning that there is no assault on 
dignity. This tends to ignore the fact that it is both the purpose and the 
effect of government action that must be scrutinized when a Charter 
claim is made and threatens to return us to an intent-based definition of 
discrimination.42 The Court’s reasoning seems to be that since inequality 
is a repudiation of essential human dignity, and since discrimination 
produces inequality, the way to discover if there has been discrimination 
is to look for proof of indignity. Why the Court cannot just consider 
discrimination and inequality directly is unclear. 
                                                                                                                                
40  G.A. Res. 217A(111) (10 December 1948), art. 1. 
41  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, c. 2, s. 10; Basic Law 
(23 May 1949) art. 1(1). For a critique of the use of “dignity” in equality rights cases in the 
German context, see Susanne Baer, “Pornography and Sexual Harassment in the EU”, in 
Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist Challenge, R.A. Elman, ed. 
(Berghahn Books: 1996) 56. See also D. Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to 
Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001)13 C.J.W.L. 37, at 55-56 (critiquing the dignity test 
in Canada with an example from the South African case law). 
42  British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Meiorin”]. 
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In Canadian Foundation, one might have thought that use of the 
dignity analysis would have benefitted the claimants, since being hit or 
slapped without the legal recourse available to other human beings is 
certainly demeaning. The majority is able to avoid confronting this 
problem directly by resorting to the four factors identified in Law. De-
spite the fact that these factors were never intended to be exhaustive or 
rigidly applied, the majority treats them as a four-part test and applies 
them mechanically to exclude the claim. In particular, there is little 
analysis of the way in which the factors relate to one another. The im-
portance of the interest in physical integrity, the vulnerability of chil-
dren, and the absence of ameliorative purposes for other disadvantaged 
groups are not enough to dislodge the conclusion that there is no dis-
crimination, since the “lack of correspondence” test is not met.  
Canadian Foundation shows once again the danger of the “corre-
spondence” factor, which, as Binnie J. notes in his partial dissent, 
threatens to reincarnate the discredited “relevance” test from the Miron 
v. Trudel trilogy.43 This concern is heightened where, as in this case, the 
Court uses the phrases “less worthy on the basis of irrelevant character-
istics” and “less worthy without regard to their actual circumstances” 
interchangeably.44 Inviting judges to determine whether the legislative 
distinction at issue “corresponds” to the claimant’s needs and circum-
stances allows them to use the same kind of circular reasoning that poi-
soned section 15(1) analysis under the “relevance” test.45 It invites 
judges to speculate on what the claimant’s “circumstances” are, and 
then make conclusions as to whether the purpose of the legislative dis-
tinction is related to them. The potential for stereotyping that uses the 
impact of pre-existing discrimination to justify further related discrimi-
nation is clear. Applied mechanically, this factor permits the Court to 
ignore the nature of the historic disadvantage and the way in which the 
distinction in question might contribute to that disadvantage, which is 
the essence of a substantive equality analysis.  
                                                                                                                                
43  Canadian Foundation, supra, note 32, at para. 97, citing Gonthier J., dissenting in 
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44. 
44  Id., at paras. 53 and 54. 
45  For criticism of Law, see B. Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 
11 Const. Forum 65, at 71-73; S. Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social 
Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 327-30; for a slightly more optimistic view, see D. 
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299. 
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Such an analysis, alive to the social and historical context in which 
the impugned practice and the ground of discrimination co-exist, would 
not end the vulnerability analysis by simply concluding, as the majority 
does here, that children are a vulnerable group and that the extent of 
their powerlessness is somehow mitigated by the fact that children “of-
ten feel a sense of disempowerment and vulnerability” at the hands of 
adults. On a substantive equality analysis, the fact that the vulnerability 
is chronic should heighten, rather than diminish, the scrutiny that is 
brought to bear on the legislative distinction, given that so many laws 
affect children in a differential and disempowering fashion. More im-
portantly, a substantive equality analysis should consider the historic 
vulnerability of children in the context of the practice at issue, namely 
the use of force against them by parents and teachers. On this point, 
there is ample evidence that children have been and continue to be the 
recipients of widespread physical and sexual violence at the hands of 
those persons who are entrusted with their care, and that this violence is 
age-based as a social practice. In 1998, there were an estimated 61,000 
substantiated reports of child maltreatment (physical, sexual and emo-
tional) investigated by police and children’s aid societies in Canada. 
Sixty-nine per cent of substantiated cases of physical abuse of children, 
or about 9,700 cases, involved inappropriate punishment, that is abuse 
administered under the guise of “correction”. Another 5,300 cases in-
volved suspected physical abuse in the guise of punishment.46  
It might also have been useful to consider the history in this country 
of physical abuse by teachers in residential schools, directed dispropor-
tionately at First Nations and disabled children, and whether giving 
teachers some licence to use physical correction contributed to that 
abuse or the difficulty of exposing it. It is this context which explains 
why any lack of convincing proof that the use of mild force is harmful is 
not especially relevant to a discrimination analysis. The point is that 
there is ample proof that parents and teachers meting out discipline are 
often unable or unwilling to limit themselves to mild force.  
                                                                                                                                
46  Health Canada, Child Maltreatment Section. The Canadian Incidence Study of Re-
ported Child Abuse and Neglect, 2001, available online at <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/pphb-
dgspsp>; N. Trocme, J. Durrant, R. Ensom, and I. Marwah, “Physical Abuse of Children in 
the Context of Punishment”, Centre of Excellence for Child Welfare fact sheet #8E, 2004, 
available online at <http://www.cecw-cepb.ca>. 
234  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Another part of the social context unmentioned by the Court is that 
there is another age-based group whose members are subject to violence 
at the hands of their family members and caregivers, namely the elderly, 
and that this group is not excluded from the protection of the criminal 
offence of assault on the basis that it risks breaking up their families to 
include them.47 
“Age-based” in this context does not refer to the formal distinction 
that children are younger than adults. It is not the youth of children per 
se that is the source of their social inequality. Children are not a histori-
cally disadvantaged group because they are young. This reasoning has 
led courts to conclude that some kinds of disadvantageous treatment of 
children or young people are not discriminatory because they will not be 
young forever.48 But the permanence of the ground is not crucial to the 
experience of discrimination, except perhaps to its severity. After all, 
pregnancy is also a temporary condition, but pregnancy discrimination 
is still recognized as sex discrimination. Societal discrimination against 
children is a product of the state-sanctioned exploitation by adults of the 
inherent power imbalance between adults and children. That exploita-
tion includes, for example, the practices identified in the international 
conventions designed to safeguard children’s rights, such as physical 
and sexual violence, child labour and lack of access to education, child 
marriage and other practices that stunt the ability of children to realize 
their full potential to exercise fully the rights and privileges of adult-
hood.49  
Regardless of the legal regime in place for responding to the vio-
lence against them, children are not able to prevent or defend against 
this violence because of their size, intellectual development and depend-
ence on adults. This is the (in)capacity that is “relevant” to the section 
15(1) analysis. The question, then, should be whether section 43 of the 
                                                                                                                                
47  L. McDonald and A. Collins, Abuse and Neglect of Older Adults: A Discussion Pa-
per (Health Canada, Family Violence Prevention Unit, 2000), at 13-15. The authors note that 
while telephone surveys of older adults living at home indicate rates of physical and verbal 
abuse of 2-7 per cent, these numbers are probably low because of reluctance to disclose and 
the omission of cognitively impaired older adults from such surveys. 
48  See, e.g., the comments of McLachlin C.J. for the majority in Gosselin v. Quebec 
(Attorney-General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at 468, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85. 
49  See, e.g., the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (20 November 
1999). 
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Criminal Code, in its purpose or effect, augments that vulnerability and 
that history of violence. If this question is answered in the affirmative, 
then absent some overriding ameliorative purpose for another disadvan-
taged group, the provision is discriminatory and violates section 15(1). 
Questions of justification (the purported need for some discipline that 
takes a physical form, the preference of Parliament to use education 
rather than criminalization to reduce the use of physical discipline) 
should be left for the section 1 analysis. 
In answering the question whether section 43 augments the existing 
vulnerability of children to parental and institutional violence, it is first 
necessary to confront an important problem of Charter analysis relating 
to the use that can be made of the existing decisions interpreting and 
applying section 43 of the Criminal Code. These decisions are, on the 
whole, remarkable for the frequency with which they interpret section 
43 to permit parents and teachers to use a considerable degree of force 
against a wide age range of children, encompassing weapons, bruising, 
blows to the head, kicking, and physical restraint.50 One approach to this 
body of precedent, favoured by the majority, is to use the existing cases 
interpreting and applying section 43 of the Criminal Code as merely a 
context for reinterpreting the provision to minimize the potential for 
violence against children in the future. In this way the Supreme Court 
creates a clean slate for the provision’s application, and concludes that 
under its new interpretation, the defence will not contribute to discrimi-
nation against children. The second approach, adopted by Deschamps J. 
in her dissent, is to use those cases as proof that section 43, as applied, 
does augment that disadvantage. 
The relevance of “past practice” in the application of a challenged 
provision is accepted in other Charter contexts, such as in freedom of 
expression challenges under section 2(b).51 Yet the degree to which this 
past practice can be obliterated through reinterpretation of the provision 
                                                                                                                                
50  A summary of these cases is found in the dissenting reasons of Arbour J., dissenting, 
at paras. 153-70. 
51  For example in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, the Court considered the past practice of Canada 
Customs in determining whether the claimant’s rights had been violated and whether Cus-
toms could be expected to avoid such violations in the future. 
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is a matter of continuing debate.52 In this case, it would seem logical to 
follow the approach of Arbour J. in her dissent on the section 7 claim, 
and to use the judicial history as evidence of how the provision is likely 
to be applied, given that the decisions turn on what is “reasonable 
force”, rather than on any clear split on a question of statutory interpre-
tation. As Arbour J. points out, the majority’s approach confirms the 
extremely narrow ambit of the vagueness doctrine under section 7, since 
past practice, however compelling, is always insufficient to prove that 
the provision is not capable of clear judicial interpretation. Moreover, if 
lower courts continue to be unable to apply the provision consistently 
after the Supreme Court decision, it will be almost impossible to renew 
the vagueness challenge since the Court has declared the provision to be 
not vague. In any event, whatever the case may be under the section 7 
vagueness doctrine, section 15(1) is clearly context-based. The way in 
which the defence has been applied, and the kind of abuse that has been 
considered “reasonable force”, are highly relevant considerations in 
deciding whether the operation of the defence violates children’s equal-
ity rights. 
Justice Binnie, dissenting in part, recognizes the shortcomings of the 
majority’s section 15(1) analysis, and finds that the section is violated. 
As noted above, he criticizes the majority for its reliance on the “corre-
spondence” factor as a litmus test for discrimination. Unfortunately, he 
imports the same kind of reasoning into the section 1 analysis, which 
leads him to uphold section 43 as it applies to parents for much the same 
reasons as the majority relies on in its section 15(1) analysis. In particu-
lar, he agrees that the “values of privacy in family life” justify the avail-
ability of the section 43 defence to parents as a reasonable limit on 
children’s equality rights. In so doing, he fails to consider whether the 
deficits of the “correspondence” test are really eradicated simply by 
moving them to section 1. In particular, the balancing of means and ends 
contemplated by section 1 is not the same as correspondence between 
the needs of the claimant (the child) and the legislative measures at 
issue. 
                                                                                                                                
52  R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15 is another decision in which 
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tional. 
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The reliance of both the majority and Binnie J. on the “privacy of 
the family” as a justification for upholding the “reasonable correction” 
defence is acutely disappointing in an equality rights challenge focused 
on acts of physical violence. Surely this “interest” has now been thor-
oughly discredited, especially in the context of family violence. Femi-
nist scholars have successfully shifted public opinion away from the 
myth that battering and rape of women by their boyfriends and husbands 
are “private” matters.53 Merely because an assault takes place in the 
bedrooms, or for that matter the playrooms, of the nation, does not mean 
that the state has no business intervening in it; most abuse of women 
and children takes place in the home. The home is a very dangerous 
place for many women and children and it is perverse to suggest that 
children benefit from respect for the privacy of family life when that 
“private life” includes violence against them.  
Section 43 of the Criminal Code undeniably “withholds from chil-
dren protection of their physical integrity in circumstances where the 
amount of force used would be criminal if used against an adult”.54 If the 
concern is that we cannot rely on police and prosecutorial discretion to 
prevent prosecution for a “pat on the bum”, we need to consider why we 
are prepared to criminalize such assaults when they occur against adults 
and rely on that same discretion to screen out such trivial touchings. 
Children are hardly more likely than adults to phone the police in order 
to resolve minor disputes. There is little question, of course, that the 
principle of absolute physical autonomy that is applied to adults is not 
and cannot be applied to pre-adolescent children, if only for reasons of 
their safety. But the provision covers correction, not protection. One 
wonders what degree of associated force is permissible to enforce the 
Chief Justice’s example of the “five-minute time out”. In R. v. Murphy, 
it involved the use of electrical tape to restrain a three-year old child to a 
chair, during which time he urinated on himself.55 In 1996, this conduct 
                                                                                                                                
53  F. Olsen was one of the first feminist legal scholars to offer a detailed critique of the 
public/private distinction: “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
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   Supra, note 32, at para. 82. 
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was found to be within the section 43 defence by the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal.  
Another way of looking at this question is to consider whether chil-
dren have anything in common with the groups of people previously 
excluded from the full protection of criminal assault provisions through 
the operation of other categorical defences. These groups would include 
wives, employees and apprentices, and passengers on ships.56 There may 
be something to be learned from the decision to abolish rules sheltering 
husbands and employers from prosecution for assaults of individuals 
under their control. These repeals reflected an evolving societal recogni-
tion that persons in positions of power should be monitored in the exer-
cise of that power, rather than given free rein to exercise violent 
“ownership” over individuals who are financially or emotionally de-
pendent on them. This reasoning of course, applies quite directly to the 
situation of parents or teachers and the children over whom they exer-
cise power and control. 
Justice Deschamps does find a violation of section 15(1) that is not 
saved by section 1. Significantly, she applies the three-step analysis set 
out in Law and based on the seminal decision in Andrews v. Law Society 
of British Columbia: 
First, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or 
(b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position 
within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment 
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics? If so, there is differential treatment for the purpose of 
section 15(1). Second, was the claimant subject to differential treatment 
on the basis of one or more of the enumerated and analogous grounds? 
And third, does the differential treatment discriminate in a substantive 
sense, bringing into play the purpose of section 15(1) of the Charter in 
                                                                                                                                
56  In Lord Leigh’s Case (1677), 3 Keb. 433 (H.L.) the House of Lord’s stated that while 
husbands could not beat their wives, they were entitled to use force for “admonition”. By 
1891, the principle was referred to as “quaint and absurd”: R. V. Jackson, [1891] 60 L.J.R. 
346 (Q.B.). The right of masters to discipline apprentices was deleted from s. 43 in the 1955 
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remedying such ills as prejudice, stereotyping and historical 
disadvantage?57 
On this analysis, the question is whether the differential treatment 
discriminates against children in a substantive sense. Justice Deschamps 
correctly notes that the four Law factors relevant to this analysis are not 
exhaustive or automatically applicable. While she also uses “impairment 
of dignity” as a proxy for substantive inequality, she correctly focuses 
on the effect of the differential treatment of children by Parliament 
rather than whether corporal punishment is itself always demeaning or 
never carried out for a proper purpose. Unfortunately, she also goes 
through a rote application of the four factors, but does come to a differ-
ent conclusion on the “correspondence” factor, based on her view that:  
There is a general consensus among experts that the only benefit of mild 
to moderate uses of force, such as spanking, is short-term compliance. 
Anything more serious is not conducive to furthering the education of 
children, but also potentially harmful to their development and health. … 
It cannot seriously be argued that children need corporal punishment to 
grow and learn. Indeed, their capacities and circumstances would 
generally point in the opposite direction...58  
Because section 43 had not been applied in such a restrictive fash-
ion, and could not be so restricted without re-writing the statute in com-
plete opposition to its terms, she found that section 15(1) was violated. 
Justice Deschamps’ reliance on the lack of benefit arising from most 
corporal punishment echoes her fact-driven conclusions in Malmo-
Levine that consumption of marijuana is a largely harmless activity. 
While this approach makes some sense when she is applying a “harm 
principle” under section 7 to marijuana possession, it is more dangerous 
in the section 15(1) context. The Court should leave the balancing of the 
harms and benefits of corporal punishment to section 1, and focus on the 
effect of the defence on children in the context of their social experience 
of violence at the hands of parents and teachers. None of the members 
of the Court undertaking a section 15(1) analysis in this case considered 
the physical punishment of children as a social practice in the context of 
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the relatively recent recognition of child abuse by parents as a serious 
and neglected problem. 
The practical danger of the majority’s decision is that parents and 
teachers will simply consider the decision an endorsement of their 
power to “spank” children, and fail to understand the Court’s attempt to 
reinterpret the provision restrictively. One is left to hope that lower 
courts considering the defence in future will truly limit its application to 
those uses of force that “restrain, control or express some symbolic 
disapproval”.59  
Since the decision in Canadian Foundation, there appears to be only 
one unreported case that considers section 43 of the Code, and its inat-
tention to the Supreme Court’s restrictions on the defence is hardly 
encouraging. In R. v. P. (D.),60 the accused kicked his 14 year-old 
daughter, bruising her leg. The kick was administered because she re-
fused to get into his car and return home. In convicting the accused of 
assault, the trial judge referred to the decision in Canadian Foundation 
as upholding the constitutionality of section 43, but did not make refer-
ence to any of the interpretive guidance provided by the Court. Most 
notably, the trial judge did not refer to the majority’s statement that 
force used against children over 12 years of age is per se unreasonable. 
Instead, he relies on prior lower court authority and finds the force un-
reasonable because it was not escalating force.61 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The majority decisions in Malmo-Levine and Canadian Foundation 
are, at their core, contradictory. The Court is prepared in Malmo-Levine 
to permit Parliament to criminalize any conduct that poses a risk of 
harm that is more than trivial. This rightfully leaves complex debates 
about risks and benefits of marijuana consumption to the democratic 
process. The Court is not prepared in Canadian Foundation to limit the 
ability of Parliament to shield individuals from criminal liability for 
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  Id., at para. 24. 
60  [2002] A.J. No. 1475, 317 A.R. 377 (C.A.). 
61  In a case decided one week before the Supreme Court decision, another trial judge 
applied s. 43 to acquit of assault a teacher who tapped a 16 year-old boy in the face for using 
a computer without permission: R. v. Storey, [2004] O.J. No. 670 (C.J.). 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) Hierarchies of Harm in Cdn. Crim. Law 241 
 
causing harm to children, on the ground that the section can be restric-
tively interpreted to apply to only “trivial” punishments. Yet if the 
Court’s reasoning in Malmo-Levine is applied in this context, trivial 
assaults would automatically be excluded from the offence of assault by 
the operation of section 7 of the Charter anyway.  
To date, section 43 of the Criminal Code has been a de maximis 
defence that should have been found to violate section 15(1) of the 
Charter.62 Striking down the defence would have ended the demon-
strated practice of using section 43 to shield abusive parents from 
conviction rather than shielding their children from violence.  
                                                                                                                                
62  This article does not consider in any depth the s. 1 argument that would flow from 
such a finding, since even if the government could articulate a pressing and substantial 
objective where touchings are minor or required for the safety of the child, s. 43 as currently 
drafted is not rationally connected to those objectives and does not minimally impair chil-
dren’s equality rights. 
 
 
 
